Abstract. This note explores the common core of constructive, intuitionistic, recursive and classical analysis from an axiomatic standpoint. In addition to clarifying the relation between Kleene's and Troelstra's minimal formal theories of numbers and number-theoretic sequences, we propose some modified choice principles and other function existence axioms which may be of use in reverse constructive analysis.
Introduction
Constructive mathematics has been described by Richman as mathematics with intuitionistic logic. Recursive, classical and a large part of constructive analysis can all be expressed in the two-sorted language Kleene and Vesley [11] used to axiomatize a significant part of intuitionistic analysis. Beginning with the minimal system M in which Kleene formalized the theory of recursive partial functionals, a rich collection of recursively axiomatizable theories can be identified and explored.
Our choice of M as a neutral base theory for reverse constructive analysis is motivated by practical and historical considerations. On the one hand, M (like the theory EL preferred by Troelstra and van Dalen) is strong enough to guarantee the existence of every provably recursive function without entailing the principle of full countable choice from numbers to numbers accepted by most, but not all, constructivists. Theorems which do not depend essentially on countable choice are thereby distinguished from those which do. And since Troelstra's original formal treatment of intuitionistic mathematics over EL depended explicitly on Kleene's detailed formal development in M of the theory of recursive functions and functionals, working directly with M satisfies our sense of the history of the subject.
On the other hand, M (unlike EL) guarantees that every detachable subset of the natural numbers has a characteristic function. This feature, which we regard as constructively justified, simplifies the statement and comparison of e.g. restricted versions of the fan theorem. In this context we introduce a new axiom schema CF d which can be used to establish a precise relationship between EL and M.
The abbreviations BISH, INT, RUSS and CLASS respectively represent Bishop constructivism, Brouwerian intuitionism, Markov's Russian recursive constructive mathematics, and classical mathematics. They were introduced by Bridges and Richman in [3] and have become standard, as has the Venn diagram suggesting that BISH is contained in each of INT, RUSS and CLASS (no two of which are compatible). Since Bishop and Brouwer accepted the countable axiom of choice, and RUSS included a recursive choice principle, M can be interpreted as a proper part of each of the main varieties of constructive analysis.
Formal reasoning, softened by the use of informal rigor, provides the certainty demanded by reverse mathematics. Sometimes formalization reveals connections which are not obvious in informal reasoning, and suggests refinements of recognized axioms. In what follows we attempt to be sufficiently precise so that a reader with some knowledge of intuitionistic logic could easily fill in the formal details.
1. Intuitionistic logic and the use of formal language 1.1. Remark on formalization. Contrary to some accounts, Brouwer did not entirely disdain the use of logic as a tool to simplify the communication of mathematical arguments. Rather, he delegated the axiomatization and formalization of intuitionistic logic, arithmetic and analysis to his student Arend Heyting ([7] , [5] , [6] ), who also contributed significantly to the informal development of intuitionistic mathematics. Heyting's treatment of intuitionistic logic and arithmetic facilitated comparison with the corresponding classical theories, but the same was not true of his formalization of intuitionistic analysis. Following Heyting's example, Kleene's [9] presented intuitionistic first-order logic, and intuitionistic arithmetic IA 0 in a language with only the constants =, 0, , +, ·, as subsystems obtained from the corresponding classical theories by weakening the law of double negation ¬¬A → A to ¬A → (A → B). To further clarify the relation between intuitionistic and classical mathematics, Kleene and Vesley [11] formalized Brouwer's analysis in a two-sorted extension of the language of arithmetic, with variables over numbers and one-place number-theoretic functions, symbols for λ-abstraction and function application, and a finite list of mathematical constants. When needed, additional constants could be added to the list, as for the precise formal treatment of recursive functionals in [10] .
Troelstra [15] formalized intuitionistic arithmetic HA in a language including a constant for every primitive recursive number-theoretic function, and elementary analysis EL in a two-sorted extension of this language, relying explicitly on [10] for the details of elementary recursion theory.
1 Troelstra [15] also gave a formal language and axioms for Heyting arithmetic in all finite types HA ω , extending HA. We restrict ourselves here to the first two types, which are adequate to express a significant part of elementary analysis, with Kleene's finite list of constants for primitive recursive functiona(al)s enumerated in a footnote.
1.2.
A two-sorted formal language and logic for intuitionistic analysis. By L 1 we mean Kleene and Vesley's two-sorted language, which is suitable for an intuitionistic theory of choice sequences and recursive functionals. L 1 has variables x,y,z, . . . , intended to range over natural numbers; variables α, β, γ, . . ., intended to range over one-place number-theoretic functions (choice sequences); finitely many constants 0, , +, ·, f 4 , . . . , f p , each representing a primitive recursive function or functional, where f i has k i places for number arguments and l i places for type-1 function arguments; parentheses indicating function application; and Church's λ.
The terms (of type 0) and functors (of type 1) are defined inductively as follows. The number variables and 0 are terms. The function variables and each f i with k i = 1, l i = 0 are functors. If t 1 , . . . , t k i are terms and u 1 , . . . , u l i are functors, then f i (t 1 , . . . , t k i , u 1 , . . . , u l i ) is a term. If x is a number variable and t is a term, then λx.t is a functor. And if u is a functor and t is a term, then (u)(t) is a term.
There is one relation symbol = for equality between terms; equality between functors u, v is defined extensionally by u = v ≡ ∀x(u(x) = v(x)). The atomic formulas of L 1 are the expressions s = t where s, t are terms. Composite formulas are defined inductively, using the connectives &, ∨, →, ¬, quantifiers ∀, ∃ of both sorts, and parentheses (often omitted under the usual conventions on scope).
Using one-place number-theoretic function variables for the choice sequences makes intuitionistic analysis expressible in the same language as a portion of classical analysis, as Kleene observed. But also, according to which mathematical axioms are present, the sequence variables can be interpreted as ranging over constructive functions (determined by algorithms) instead of choice sequences, facilitating the comparison of various branches of constructive analysis.
The logical basis of each of the axiomatic theories T we consider in this language will be two-sorted intuitionistic predicate logic, as presented e.g. in [11] . In each case a corresponding classical theory T • is obtained by strengthening the intuitionistic negation axiom schema ¬A → (A → B) to the classical ¬¬A → A.
2. Some essential axioms for intuitionistic analysis 2.1. Axioms for two-sorted intuitionistic arithmetic IA 1 . The weakest theory considered here is a formal system of two-sorted intuitionistic arithmetic IA 1 , a conservative extension (in the language L 1 ) of the first-order intuitionistic arithmetic IA 0 in [9] based on =, 0, , +, ·. The mathematical axioms of IA 1 are:
(a) The axiom-schema of mathematical induction (for all formulas of L 1 ):
The axioms of IA 0 for =, 0, , +, · (axioms 14-21 on p. 82 of [9] ) and the axioms expressing the primitive recursive definitions of the additional function constants f 4 , . . . , f 26 given in [11] and [10]. 
where α, x are free for y in A(x, y) and the unique existential quantifier ∃!y expresses "there is exactly one y" in L 1 . We use ∃!yB(y) as an abbreviation for either
and ∃!yA(x, y) → ∀y(A(x, y) ∨ ¬A(x, y)) are provable in IA 1 , the schema AC 00 ! (called "non-choice" by Myhill and "unique choice" by many) expresses countable numerical choice for decidable predicates.
AC 00 ! also guarantees that every decidable predicate of natural numbers has a characteristic function, since IA 1 proves (B(x) ∨ ¬B(x)) ↔ ∃!y ≤ 1(y = 0 ↔ B(x)). This feature of M makes it possible to avoid explicit decidability hypotheses 2 f0 − f3 are 0, , +, · respectively. f4(a, b) = a b (exponentiation), and f5, . . . , f20 represent the primitive recursive function(al)s a!, a−b, pd(a), min(a, b), max(a, b), sg(a), sg(a), |a−b|, rm(a, b), [a/b], Σ y<b α(y), Π y<b α(y), min y≤b α(y), max y≤b α(y), pa (the a th prime, with p0 = 2), and (a)i (the exponent of pi in the prime factorization of a) respectively. f21(a) = lh(a) represents the number of positive exponents in the prime factorization of a. The remaining function constants will be described as needed.
by introducing sequence variables appropriately; sometimes this device reduces a schema to a single formula.
If E and F are two schemas, we may say "F is a constructive consequence of E" if every instance of F is derivable in M from instances of E, and "E and F are constructively equivalent" if each is a constructive consequence of the other.
2.3. Digression on "at most one". Because principles with uniqueness play a fundamental role in constructive mathematics, it is important to be clear about the formal treatment of statements like "A(x) holds for at most one x." The most straightforward choice seems to be (a) ∀x∀y(A(x) & A(y) → x = y). However, recent work of the Bishop school renders "A(x) holds for at most one x" formally by (b) ∀x∀y(x = y → ¬A(x) ∨ ¬A(y)). Although M proves (b) → (a), the two interpretations are not constructively equivalent, as the following example shows.
Example. Consider the formula
where P is any formula and x any variable not occurring free in P. We can easily see that for this A(x), condition (a) holds in M; however, condition (b) entails ¬A(0) ∨ ¬A(1) and hence ¬P ∨ ¬¬P, which is unprovable in M in general.
3
Observe however that under either of the assumptions ∀x(¬A(x) ∨ ¬¬A(x)) or ∃xA(x), we have (a) ↔ (b). Thus either interpretation of "at most one" could be used to unabbreviate the ! in AC 00 !.
2.4.
Two equivalent reformulations of AC 00 !. The minimal formal theory M entails the countable sequence comprehension schema AC 01 !:
where α, x are free for β in A(x, β), (x, t) abbreviates 2 x · 3 t , and ∃!βB(β) ab-
Another equivalent version of AC 00 ! is a least number comprehension principle AC µ 00 , efficiently formulated with the help of a modified existential quantifier. Let ∃ µ yB(y) abbreviate ∃y(B(y) & ∀x < y¬B(x)). Then AC µ 00 is the schema
If we add to M a continuity principle, say WC!, and take as P the formula ∃x α(x) = 0, we can prove ¬∀α[¬∃x α(x) = 0 ∨ ¬¬∃x α(x) = 0] (for a similar result see FIM p. 84). 4 We observed that the unique existential number quantifier has the property IA1 ∃!yB(y) → ∀y(B(y) ∨ ¬B(y)) so over IA1 it makes no difference whether the "∃!y" in AC00! is defined using (a) or (b) (see paragraphs 2.2, 2.3 above). The corresponding property for ∃!β fails constructively since ∃!βA(β) → ¬∀β[A(β) ∨ ¬A(β)] is provable in intuitionistic analysis. Thus it matters how "at most one β" is expressed in the formal language. 5 However, note that M ∃ µ yB(y) → ∀y(B(y) ∨ ¬B(y)). For a counterexample let B(y) be y = 0 ∨ (y = 1 & P) where M P ∨ ¬P and y is not free in P; cf. §2.3.
2.5.
A characteristic function principle CF d . Consider the following schema, which asserts that every decidable predicate of natural numbers has a characteristic function and is an immediate consequence of AC 00 ! over IA 1 :
Proof. For a classical model of IA 1 + CF d which fails to satisfy AC 00 !, let the sequence variables range over the subclass Pb of ω ω consisting of all sequences which are bounded by primitive recursive functions. That is, β ∈ Pb if and only if there is a primitive recursive α such that β ≤ α (i.e. ∀x[β(x) ≤ α(x)]). Using the observation that every primitive recursive functional Φ(α, x) = y is bounded by a primitive recursive functional (with the same arguments) which is monotone nondecreasing in each argument separately, one can show that Pb is closed under composition and primitive recursion, so under the interpretation each functor u represents a sequence in Pb. The axioms for the function constants, and the axiom schemas for ∀α and ∃α, all hold for this reason. The rules of inference and other axioms pose no problem.
The model evidently satisfies CF d . However, there is an arithmetical formula A(x, y) (numeralwise) representing the graph of the Ackermann function, such that ∀x∃!yA(x, y) is provable even in IA 0 ; but the Ackermann function has no primitive recursive bound. So the model fails to satisfy AC 00 !.
Proposition 2. Over IA 1 + CF d , the axiom schema AC 00 ! is interderivable with the axiom ∀ρ[∀x∃!yρ((x, y)) = 0 → ∃α∀xρ((x, α(x))) = 0], where (x, y) = 2 x · 3 y .
2.6. Quantifier-free countable choice QF-AC 00 . The quantifier-free axiom of countable choice is the schema QF-AC 00 :
where A(x, y) is quantifier-free. Predicates with only bounded numerical quantifiers can be reduced to quantifier-free form over IA 1 + QF-AC 00 using f 15 Proof. There is a classical model of IA 1 in which the sequence variables are interpreted as ranging over all general recursive functions of one variable, in which QF-AC 00 is true. But this is not a model of M, since AC 00 ! with classical logic gives the existence of nonrecursive sequences.
2.7.
Comparison with Troelstra's EL. EL is the basic theory for elementary analysis defined in [17] (p. 144) and [15] (p. 72). One difference between Kleene's minimal system M and Troelstra's EL is that M assumes the function existence principle AC 00 ! while EL has instead QF-AC 00 . It turns out that this is their only essential difference. Here we announce some results by the second author, establishing that EL is essentially weaker than M, while EL + CF d is essentially equivalent to M.
The formal theory EL, like M, is based on two-sorted intuitionistic predicate logic, with variables for natural numbers and for one-place number-theoretic functions, a constant denoting function application, Church's λ, and = for equality of numbers. But, unlike M, EL has as a basis a different system of two-sorted intuitionistic arithmetic HA 1 , a conservative extension of first-order intuitionistic arithmetic HA ("Heyting arithmetic"); the language of HA differs from that of IA 0 in that it has infinitely many function constants, one
The mathematical axioms of HA 1 are the axioms of HA, with the schema of mathematical induction for all formulas of the language of HA 1 , the axiom-schema of λ-conversion, and axioms for the recursor constant rec:
with t,t terms and φ a functor (where S is the successor). EL is obtained by adding QF-AC 00 to HA 1 . [8] ) is often taken as basis for constructive reverse mathematics, most results have been obtained in systems essentially equivalent to M such as WKV ( [12] ) and EL + AC 00 !, or even stronger ones such as EL + AC 00 . The formal system BIM proposed by Veldman [18] as a basis for intuitionistic reverse mathematics avoids assuming CF d as an axiom schema by defining "decidable set" as "set with a characteristic function." 6 6 For detailed comparisons of all these formal systems we refer to the second author's PhD Thesis, in preparation.
Variations on countable choice
Brouwer, Heyting, Bishop and Kleene-Vesley all represented real numbers by Cauchy sequences of (primitive recursive codes for) rational numbers, sometimes specifying a particular rate of convergence. Troelstra and van Dalen ( [17] p. 253) require that each Cauchy real be given together with a Cauchy modulus for it. Adding the axiom schema AC 00 of countable numerical choice (like AC 00 ! but without the !) would guarantee the existence of a Cauchy modulus for each Cauchy sequence of rationals, but either of the apparently weaker schemas AC m 00 and AB 00 described below would have the same effect. The corresponding principle AC m 01 is ∀x∃ m βA(x, β) → ∃α∀xA(x, λt.α((x, t))),
where
Following Vesley's Chapter III of [11] , let α ∈ R abbreviate
The condition following ∀k∃x is not monotone in x, but α ∈ R is easily seen to be equivalent in M to the formula
which Vesley abbreviates by α ∈ R 1 . Then
since the hypothesis satisfies the monotonicity condition on x. This example suggests that AC m 00 is not provable in M. Certainly M does not prove ∃ m yB(y) → ∀y(B(y) ∨ ¬B(y)) in general, as the following example shows.
Example. Consider the formula A(x) ≡ (x = 0 & P) ∨ (x > 0), where P is any formula not containing x free. Clearly ∃xA(x) and ∀x∀y(A(x) & x ≤ y → A(y)). Assuming that M entails the above schema, we get ∀x(A(x) ∨ ¬A(x)) and specializing for x=0 we have A(0) ∨ ¬A(0), from which follows P ∨ ¬P; but then M would prove P ∨ ¬P for any P, which is impossible.
The reader might wonder why we require monotonicity above every instantiation y, in order for ∃ m yB(y) to hold. One reason is that if B(y) is decidable then ∃ m yB(y) will be formally ∆ 0 2 rather than just Σ 0 2 . Observe also that with our definition of ∃ m , assuming the hypothesis of AC m 00 , the conclusion of AC m 00 is equivalent to ∃α∀x∀y ≥ α(x)A(x, y).
7 A canonical real number generator is a sequence α such that ∀x|2α(x) − α(x + 1)| ≤ 1, representing the sequence {α(n)/2 n } of dyadic rationals. Canonical real number generators form a particularly nice spread in which each node but the root has just two or three immediate successors, and Cauchy moduli are needed to show that every real number generator coincides with a canonical one.
3.2.
Bounded countable choice and a bounding axiom. Countable choice can be weakened either by strengthening the hypothesis by bounding the search, as in the schema BC 00 with β free:
or by weakening the conclusion to provide a bound, rather than an exact choice. The second alternative is expressed by the schema AB 00 :
∀x∃yA(x, y) → ∃β∀x∃y ≤ β(x)A(x, y).
Evidently, AC 00 is constructively equivalent to AB 00 + BC 00 , while M + AB 00 proves that every Cauchy sequence of reals has a Cauchy modulus. 
Moreover, by AB 00 : ∃β∀x∃y ≤ β(x)A(x, y). Given such a β, the functor u = λx.Σ z≤β(x) Π y≤z t(x, y) satisfies ∀xA(x, u(x)), and so ∃α∀xA(x, α(x)).
Proposition 13. Over IA 1 (and hence over M), AC m 00 and AB 00 are equivalent. Proof. Evidently IA 1 ∀x∃yA(x, y) → ∀x∃y∃z ≤ yA(x, z) where ∃z ≤ yA(x, z) is monotone in y; hence IA 1 + AC m 00 AB 00 . And if A(x, y) is monotone in y then (in IA 1 ) the conclusion of AB 00 entails the conclusion of AC m 00 . Theorem 14. M does not prove BC 00 , so M is a proper subtheory of IA 1 + QF-AC 00 + BC 00 .
Proof. One of the many results in S. Weinstein's ingenious investigation [19] of Kripke models for intuitionistic analysis is that AC 00 is stronger than AC 00 ! over a minimal two-sorted intuitionistic theory. 8 His proof actually showed that AC 00 ! is insufficient to prove a particular closed formula of the form
where A(x) is ¬∃yP(x, y), B(x) is ¬∃yQ(x, y), and P(x, y), Q(x, y) are quantifierfree formulas numeralwise expressing (in M) recursive relations P (x, y), Q(x, y) such that the sets {n ∈ ω | ∃m ∈ ω P (n, m)} and {n ∈ ω | ∃m ∈ ω Q(n, m)} are nonempty, disjoint and recursively inseparable. By essentially the same argument, M does not prove BC 00 .
The questions whether M + AB 00 proves BC 00 , and whether M + BC 00 proves AB 00 , are open.
The arguments in this section have obvious consequences for EL, for example the proof of Proposition 12 establishes that EL ⊆ HA 1 + AB 00 .
Variations on the bar theorem
Brouwer's bar theorem, whose axiomatic character was established in [11] , can be stated in various ways, depending on the condition the bar predicate is required to satisfy. Before discussing the constructive versions, it is useful to consider the classical bar theorem BI • :
where u, v, w, u 0 , v 0 , . . . range over (primitive recursive) codes for finite sequences, α(x + 1) represents the code for α(0), . . . , α(x), s represents the code for a oneelement sequence with s as its element, α(0) = the code 1 for the empty sequence, and * the concatenation operation on sequence codes.
In [11] Kleene provided an example showing that the classical bar theorem entails ∀β(∀xβ(x) = 0 ∨ ¬∀xβ(x) = 0) so cannot be an axiom schema of intuitionistic analysis. In its place he proposed four alternate, constructively acceptable forms of bar induction which are interderivable over M and consistent with continuous and countable choice.
4.1.
The bar theorem with a decidable, thin or efficient bar. As an axiom schema for FIM interpreting Brouwer's "Bar Theorem" Kleene chose the schema BI d of bar induction with a decidable (detachable) bar:
He considered three other versions, which we denote by BI!, BI µ and BI f . The first two of these, each equivalent to BI d over IA 1 , are obtained from BI d by replacing the hypotheses ∀α∃xR(α(x)) & ∀w(R(w) ∨ ¬R(w)) by ∀α∃!xR(α(x)) or ∀α∃ µ xR(α(x)) respectively. The third version BI f is
which is equivalent to BI d over M or IA 1 + CF d .
4.2.
The monotone bar theorem. Requiring only that the predicate R(α(x)) be monotone in x increases the strength of the bar theorem over M. Let BI mon be
This schema entails BI! over M (cf. [11] p. 79), but in order to derive BI mon from BI! a weak continuous choice principle is often used. Certainly "Brouwer's Principle for Numbers" ( x 27.2 in [11] ) suffices, so BI mon is provable in FIM although FIM + BI • is inconsistent. The use of continuous choice is obviously not essential, since BI mon is classically correct. Alternatively, consider the following monotone choice schema AC m 1/2,0 : 
The classical bar theorem BI • follows constructively from BI! + AC • 1/2,0 , so this choice principle is constructively unacceptable. However, as we see in the next section, the corresponding schema for fans holds in intuitionistic analysis. Now consider the bounding schema AB • 1/2,0 :
The classical bar theorem BI • follows constructively from BI mon + AB • 1/2,0 so this principle is also constructively unacceptable, although the corresponding schema for fans holds in intuitionistic analysis.
There is, however, a classically and intuitionistically correct choice axiom with the same hypothesis, the schema AC 1/2,0 :
This is an immediate consequence of Brouwer's Principle for Numbers ( * 27.2 in [11] ) and is classically equivalent to AC • 1/2,0 . Should it be acceptable to a Bishop constructivist who accepts AC 00 and AC 01 ? Bishop's insistence that every existential assertion should be backed up by an algorithm seems to dictate a positive answer.
Variations on the fan theorem
A fan is a spread in which only finite branching is allowed. The canonical example is the binary fan, on which this section focuses, just as the preceding section concentrated on the universal spread. The most general classically correct version of Brouwer's Fan Theorem for the binary fan (sometimes called the full fan theorem) is expressed by the schema FT:
FT is a constructive consequence of BI • , and is interderivable classically (but not constructively) with the schema KL:
expressing König's Lemma for the binary fan. Adding the hypothesis ∀w[w ∈ 2 * & A(w) → A(w * 0 ) & A(w * 1 )] to FT gives a schema FT mon constructively equivalent to FT, because the conclusion of the fan theorem is monotone and M proves ∀α ∈ 2 N [∃xA(α(x)) ↔ ∃yB(α(y))] where B(w) is ∃u ≤ w∃v ≤ w(A(u) & w = u * v). Since FT mon is a constructive consequence of BI mon it follows that, unlike BI • , FT is consistent with continuous choice; in fact, FT is provable in FIM.
Proposition 16. IA 1 + BC 00 + FT does not prove QF-AC 00 .
Proof. The classical model used to prove Theorem 1 and Proposition 8 satisfies FT.
It follows that M is not a subtheory of IA 1 + BC 00 + FT, and EL is not a subtheory of HA 1 + BC 00 + FT.
5.1.
The decidable fan theorem. The decidable fan theorem FT d for the binary fan is the schema
which is constructively equivalent to the single axiom FT f :
as well as to the schema FT!:
and the schema FT µ : Over M we can state each of their new versions as a single axiom with a free sequence variable. Thus FT c can be expressed by ∀α ∈ 2 N ∃y∀u ∈ 2 * ρ(α(y) * u) = 0 → ∃y∀α ∈ 2 N ∀zρ(α(y + z)) = 0.
Using the convention that ρ(w, n) abbreviates ρ((w, n)) where (w, n) = 2 w · 3 n , the schema
Now consider the schema AB 2 N 1/2,0 :
Over M, FT is constructively equivalent to FT d + AB 2 N 1/2,0 . This equivalence holds locally as well as globally: Proof. WKL!! can be shown to be constructively equivalent to the conjunction of the principles MP ∨ and ¬¬WKL. Every theorem of M + FT d is G realizable, but MP ∨ is not (cf. [13] ).
The method of proof of Proposition 19 actually shows that M + BI d does not prove WKL!!, and an analogous argument using Kleene function realizability shows that M + BI d + WKL!! does not prove WKL. Complete proofs of these results, and of Theorem 17, are part of a note in preparation by the first author.
All the results in Sections 2.6 and 2.7 are part of the second author's PhD dissertation, in preparation. A further investigation of principles with uniqueness is being undertaken by the second author.
Conclusion
We have tried to suggest one way of organizing reverse constructive analysis, using a formal framework in which the theory of recursive partial functionals and the intuitionistic theory of real numbers have already been developed in detail. We have also tried to show how this framework relates to the one preferred by Troelstra and used by some practitioners of constructive reverse mathematics. Our aim is to simplify comparison of results among the three main constructive traditions, and also to facilitate comparison with classical reverse mathematics.
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